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- SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
- --------
- No. 91-339
- --------
- WALTER LEE, SUPERINTENDENT OF PORT
- AUTHORITY POLICE, PETITIONER v. INTERNATION-
- AL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA CONSCIOUSNESS, INC.,
- et al.
- on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
- appeals for the second circuit
- [June 26, 1992]
-
- Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice White,
- Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas join, dissenting.
- Leafletting presents risks of congestion similar to those
- posed by solicitation. It presents, in addition, some risks
- unique to leafletting. And of course, as with solicitation,
- these risks must be evaluated against a backdrop of the
- substantial congestion problem facing the Port Authority
- and with an eye to the cumulative impact that will result
- if all groups are permitted terminal access. Viewed in this
- light, I conclude that the distribution ban, no less than the
- solicitation ban, is reasonable. I therefore dissent from the
- Court's holding striking the distribution ban.
- I will not trouble to repeat in detail all that has been
- stated in No. 91-155, International Society for Krishna
- Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, ante, p. ___, describing the risks
- and burdens flowing to travelers and the Port Authority
- from permitting solicitation in airport terminals. Suffice it
- to say that the risks and burdens posed by leafletting are
- quite similar to those posed by solicitation. The weary,
- harried, or hurried traveler may have no less desire and
- need to avoid the delays generated by having literature
- foisted upon him than he does to avoid delays from a
- financial solicitation. And while a busy passenger perhaps
- may succeed in fending off a leafletter with minimal dis-
- ruption to himself by agreeing simply to take the proffered
- material, this does not completely ameliorate the dangers
- of congestion flowing from such leafletting. Others may
- choose not simply to accept the material but also to stop
- and engage the leafletter in debate, obstructing those who
- follow. Moreover, those who accept material may often
- simply drop it on the floor once out of the leafletter's range,
- creating an eyesore, a safety hazard, and additional clean-
- up work for airport staff. See City Council of Los Angeles
- v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 816-817 (1984)
- (aesthetic interests may provide basis for restricting
- speech); Sloane Supplemental Affidavit -10, App. 514
- (noting increased maintenance problems that result from
- solicitation and distribution).
- In addition, a differential ban that permits leafletting but
- prohibits solicitation, while giving the impression of
- permitting the Port Authority at least half of what it seeks,
- may in fact prove for the Port Authority to be a much more
- Pyrrhic victory. Under the regime that is today sustained,
- the Port Authority is obliged to permit leafletting. But
- monitoring leafletting activity in order to ensure that it is
- only leafletting that occurs, and not also soliciting, may
- prove little less burdensome than the monitoring that would
- be required if solicitation were permitted. At a minimum,
- therefore, I think it remains open whether at some future
- date the Port Authority may be able to reimpose a complete
- ban, having developed evidence that enforcement of a
- differential ban is overly burdensome. Until now it has had
- no reason or means to do this, since it is only today that
- such a requirement has been announced.
- For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons stated in
- the opinion in No. 91-155, ante, at ___, I respectfully
- dissent.
-